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We describe an educational game in collaborative logistics. The game is based on an award-winning appli-cation in cost allocation in transportation. The purpose of the game is to acquire an understanding of
negotiation, coalition building, and cost/profit sharing when the players have different powers and hold differ-
ent levels of information. The game is played with each player representing a single company. The challenge for
the players is to find an efficient coalition and to share the benefits and costs of the collaboration. We describe the
underlying case study, review basic concepts in game theory, outline the teaching case, and discuss experiences
from running the game in several countries and with students in business, engineering, and forestry.
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1. Introduction
As enterprises are specializing and diversifying, they
rely more on collaborations with other business enti-
ties (Audy et al. 2011). Organizations are adopting
these strategies in order to outdo the competi-
tion; access new markets, while being mindful of
operational, social, and environmental constraints.
Furthermore, by sharing costs and information, orga-
nizations are able to optimize their logistics activities.
However, each enterprise has its own objectives and
typically makes its own planning decisions to maxi-
mize individual profit. Therefore, it becomes crucial
to anticipate how business entities can work together,
how they can value their collaboration, and how they
can share the benefits of collaboration. In order to
illustrate the behavior when companies are faced with
the task of sharing information and agree on shar-
ing benefits, we have developed a teaching case based
on an industrial case study described in Frisk et al.
(2010). This article won the EURO Management Sci-
ence Strategic Innovation Prize in 2007. The teach-
ing case is run as a game, is easy to understand,
and can be used in many logistics or quantitative
courses and for many different students. We have
used it with Master’s students at business and engi-
neering schools, with professionals in transportation
planning, and with business executives. In addition,
we have utilized it in several countries, including
Sweden, Norway, Canada, France, and Chile.
A popular educational game is the “beer distribu-
tion game” (beer game) developed at MIT (Sterman
1989). It is a simulation game to illustrate the impact of
the bullwhip effect in supply chains and it serves stu-
dents to understand how supply chain work and has
motivated research on supply chains integration and
synchronization challenges. Electronic versions of the
game also exist; see, e.g., Simchi-Levi et al. (2003). The
beer game has also been adopted and implemented
for different sectors; for example, the FORAC Research
Consortium developed an online version for the for-
est industry (Wood Supply Game 2012). The impor-
tance and positive effects of making use of business
games as teaching tools in Management Science (MS)
and Operations Research (OR) courses are discussed
in Griffin (2007) and Ben-Zvi and Carton (2007). It is
argued that business games are an effective way to
engage students with MS/OR topics. They provide an
understanding of the real problems and the practical
situations faced by companies or organizations. There
exist games for several industrial sectors. Recently,
Talluri (2009) described a game for teaching revenue
management and Allon and Van Mieghem (2010)
described one for supply chain sourcing. A taxon-
omy of online simulation games is described in Wood
(2007). Cochran (2005) is also a reference for classroom
games and related literature. Sniedovich (2002) dis-
cusses the importance and use of educational games.
A short and limited version of the game in this paper
is also described in D’Amours and Rönnqvist (2010a).
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In this paper, we describe the case study and its
history, review some basic concepts in game theory,
describe the game and how it is played, and we pro-
vide some general observations. A two-hour lecture
where the game is played is divided into four parts.
In the first part, the background of the industrial case
study and settings of the teaching case and game
rules are introduced. In the second and third parts,
the game is played in two runs. In the first run, a
restricted game is played, where the number of par-
ticipants in each coalition is limited to two at most. In
the second run, any collaboration and size of one or
several coalitions are allowed. In the fourth and final
part, the results and experiences of the industrial case
study are described and discussed as well as a review
of the theoretical background.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In §2, we
describe the case study used in the game. In §3, we
provide some basic concepts in game theory for
instructors not familiar with game theory. We present
these concepts to the students after playing the game.
In §4, we describe what happened in the real case. In
§5, we describe some material used to play the game.
In §6, we describe experiences from running the game
in different settings. We end with some concluding
remarks.
2. Case Study
The data used in this paper have been taken from
a case study done by the Forestry Research Insti-
tute of Sweden for eight participating forest compa-
nies. These companies operate in the southern part of
Sweden as shown in Figure 1. The shaded areas are
the locations of supply areas and the stars are mills.
In total there are 898 harvest areas and 101 mills. The
total number of products is 39. A product is a log
type with a specific combination of species, diameter,
length, and quality. Demand is expressed as a volume
per product.
In our case we consider the problem of coordinating
fiber procurement and transportation for all or some
of the eight companies. It is common that transport
costs can be decreased if companies use wood barter-
ing. However, this is difficult because planners do not
want to reveal supply, demand, and cost information
to competitors. In practice, this is solved by deciding
on wood bartering of specific volumes. Today, this is
typically done in an ad hoc manner and is mostly
dependent on personal relations. In Figure 2, we illus-
trate the potential benefits of wood bartering when
two companies are involved. Here, we have four mills
at two companies (each company is responsible for
two mills) together with a set of supply points for
each company. On the left-hand side, each company
operates by itself. The transportation distances are rel-
atively long as compared to the right side where all
supply and demand points are used jointly by both
companies. Because the overall cost is more or less
proportional to the distance, it is clear that the solu-
tion on the right side with collaboration is much bet-
ter than the left side without collaboration.
The data to support the case study are taken from
companies records reporting on fiber procurement
and transportation carried out during one typical
month. They involve all transports from the eight
companies and include information on time, origin
destination, volume, and product. The level of activ-
ity varies within the companies. Table 1 shows the
volume transported and the proportion of the total
transported volume for each of the companies. Com-
panies are of different sizes, for example, company 2
is much larger than company 8. While playing the
game, the players typically experience the power of
the larger companies in the negotiation process. For
example, player holding company 8 rarely gets any
attention from the other players.
The companies operate in southern Sweden and
cover different geographical areas; see Figure 3 where
the green areas show the supply areas and the red
circles denote the mills. Some companies cover the
entire region (e.g., company 2) and others only a
part (e.g., company 1). There is a correlation between
the overlap in coverage, between two companies and
the potential for cost savings from collaboration. For
example, if companies 2 and 3 collaborate, the cost
savings can be large whereas if companies 1 and 3
collaborate, the cost savings would be smaller.
From the case study, we had detailed information
on all transports made by the eight companies. With
this information, we can compute the optimal cost for
each company as well as the cost if all eight com-
panies work together. In addition, we can also com-
pute the cost of all possible coalitions. There are 247
(28–1–8) coalitions possible. Transportation costs
for all coalitions were computed with the system
FlowOpt (Forsberg et al. 2005). This is a decision
support system that includes a geographical infor-
mation system, the Swedish road database NVDB,
and optimization routines to solve the OR models.
The transportation planning problem is to decide
how to transport logs from supply to demand points.
The transportation can be done directly or indirectly
through terminals. Moreover, there are several trans-
portation modes, including trucks, trains, and ships.
In Table 2, we provide information on the actual
cost of the transportation activities, the cost when
transportation is optimized within the company, and
finally the cost when all companies are working
together. The total saving when all companies are
working together is 8.6%. In the game, for consistency
we use only the optimized values. We do not use the
actual costs because the companies might differ in
how effectively the plan their operations.
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Figure 1 Illustration of Geographical Area Where the Companies Operate in Southern Sweden
3. Basic Concepts in Collaboration
One important aim of the game is to provide an
understanding of the negotiation process of cost shar-
ing mechanisms, and the importance of trust and
fairness. Some important concepts needed for this
are found in the game theory literature. This section
is provided for the instructors who might want to
review these concepts with the students at the end
of the game. It is based on the description found in
D’Amours and Rönnqvist (2010b). We will describe a
number of sharing principles once the coalition has
been formed and agreed upon. We start by introduc-
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Figure 2 Illustration of Wood Bartering Between Two Companies
Company 1:
No collaboration Collaboration
Company 2:
Notes. On the left, the transportation flows for two companies (indicated in dotted and dark lines) work with their own supply and demand. On the right, the
companies treat their supply and demand as common. The total distance is about 50% shorter using a common wood bartering.
ing some basic notation used in game theory. We will
discuss sharing principles based on cost allocation
methods. We have a set of business entities N . A coali-
tion S is a subset of business entities; i.e., S ⊂N . The
grand coalition is the set of all entities, i.e., N . The cost
of a coalition is denoted c4S5.
A cost allocation method distributes (or allocates)
the total cost of a coalition to the entities. In many
cases there is an assumption that we use the grand
coalition as a basis, but below we may have any
coalition as a basis for the allocation. This aspect is
important because it is often needed to establish the
contribution of all possible coalitions. Each entity j
will be allocated the cost yj . A coalition set consisting
of only one entity j is denoted 8j9. Because the total
cost is to be distributed among the entities, we have∑
j∈s
yj = c4S50 (1)
A cost allocation that satisfies the above constraint
is said to be efficient. There are other properties that
can be associated with a cost allocation. One property
that requires that the entity not be allocated a higher
Table 1 Monthly Volumes (Cubic Meters) for Each of the Eight
Companies
Company Volume Proportion (%)
Company 1 771300 808
Company 2 3011300 3402
Company 3 2321100 2603
Company 4 891300 1001
Company 5 941770 1007
Company 6 441509 500
Company 7 361786 402
Company 8 61446 007
cost than its own cost is called individual rationality.
This is simply expressed as
yj ≤ c48j950 (2)
Another important concept is to ensure that there is
no incentive for a coalition to break out and work
independently. This implies that the cost allocated to a
particular coalition of entities cannot exceed the actual
cost of the coalition. There are many potential coali-
tions and this means that we have one constraint for
each possible coalition. This can be expressed as∑
j∈S′
yj ≤ c4S5 ∀S ′ ⊂ S0 (3)
Constraint sets (1) and (3) define what is called the
core. Any solution in the core is called stable. In gen-
eral, there is no guarantee that there exists a solution
in to the core. The game is said to be monotone if
c4S ′5≤ c4S51 S ′ ⊂ S0 (4)
This means that if one new entity is included in a
coalition, the cost never decreases. The game is said
to be proper if
c4S5+ c4T 5≥ c4S ∪ T 51 S ∩ T = 0 (5)
This implies that it is always profitable (or at least
not unprofitable) to form larger coalitions. The prop-
erties discussed above are not satisfied for all classes
of games. Some may be guaranteed and others not.
For each coalition, S, and a cost allocation, y, we can
compute the excess
e4S1y5= c4S5−∑
j∈S
yj1 (6)
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Figure 3 Supply Areas (Indicated with Green) and Demand Points or Mills (Indicated with Red Circles) for the Companies
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Company 4
Company 5 Company 6 Company 7 Company 8
which expresses the difference between the total cost
of a coalition and the sum of the costs allocated to its
members. For a given cost allocation, the vector of all
excesses can be thought of as a measure of how far
the cost allocation is from the core. If a cost allocation
is not in the core, at least one excess is negative.
Many quantitative allocation rules exist and we will
discuss some that have been used in different appli-
cations. A simple and straightforward allocation is to
Table 2 Real and Optimized Costs Associated with Each Company
and when All Work Together
Company Cost-real Cost-opt Cost-all
Company 1 31894 31780
Company 2 151757 141860
Company 3 101704 101340
Company 4 51084 41960
Company 5 41828 41740
Company 6 21103 21067
Company 7 11934 11884
Company 8 333 333
Companies 1–8 391253
Total 441637 421964 391253
Note. All costs, are given in kSEK (thousands of Swedish kronor).
distribute the total cost of the coalition among the
participants according to a volume or a cost weighted
measure. This allocation is called weighted costs and is
expressed by the formula
yj =
c48j95∑
j∈S c48j95
c4S50 (7)
This allocation method is intuitive but can often lead
to an allocation that does not satisfy the core condi-
tions. A more advanced method is based on dividing
the allocation into two parts. One is associated with a
separable cost and the other a nonseparable cost. The
separable cost or the marginal cost (7) of entity j and
the nonseparable cost (9) can be expressed as
mj = c4S5− c4S\8j95 (8)
gS = c4S5−
∑
j∈S
mj (9)
The separable cost for an entity j is simply the
cost difference between the case when the entity is
included in the grand coalition or not. This is a mea-
sure of the overall impact by including entity j or
not. If this marginal cost is added for all entities we
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do not obtain, in general, the cost of the grand coali-
tion. This latter difference is the nonseparable cost.
Methods based on separable and nonseparable costs
allocate the costs according to
yj =mj +
wj∑
j∈S wj
gS 0 (10)
Depending on which weights are chosen, there are
different versions of the method. The two most
straightforward methods are called the equal charge
method, which distributes the nonseparable cost
equally, and the alternative cost avoided method,
which uses the weights wj = c48j95 − mj . The latter
method expresses savings that are made for each par-
ticipant by joining the grand coalition instead of oper-
ating alone. These allocations satisfy the efficiency
and symmetry properties; however, they are not nec-
essarily in the core. These and other additional ver-
sions are discussed in Tijs and Driessen (1986).
The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is a solution con-
cept that provides us with a unique solution to the
cost allocation problem. The underlying idea is based
on the assumption that the grand coalition is formed
by entering the entities into this coalition one at a
time. As each entity enters the coalition, it is allo-
cated the marginal cost, and this means that its entry
increases the total cost of the coalition it enters. The
amount an entity receives by this scheme depends
on the order in which the entities are entered. The
Shapley value is the average marginal cost of the
entity, if the entities are entered in completely random
order. The cost allocated to entity j is equal to
yj =
∑
S′⊂S−8j9
S ′!4S − S ′ − 15!
S! 4c4S
′ ∪ 8j95− c4S ′550 (11)
Here  ·  denotes the number of entities in the con-
sidered coalition. The quantity, c4S ∪ 8j95− c4S5, is the
amount by which the cost of coalition S increases
when entity j joins it, here denoted by the marginal
cost of entity j with respect to the coalition S. The
Shapley value satisfies the efficiency property but
does not necessarily satisfy the stability or the indi-
vidual rationality properties.
When solving the transportation model used in the
case study, we get dual or shadow prices for each
of the supply and demand constraints. We define ui
and vj as the shadow prices of the flow conservation
constraints for the supply and demand constraints,
respectively. Here, i and j are the indices of the sup-
ply nodes 4i5 and demand nodes 4j5, respectively. The
supply in supply node i is denoted si and demand at
demand node j is denoted dj . The set of supply nodes
are denoted l and the set of demand nodes J . When
we solve the transportation model for the coalition
S =N , we get c4N 50 The optimal dual solution has the
property
c4N 5=∑
i∈I
uisi +
∑
j∈J
vjdj 0 (12)
A distribution of costs in linear production mod-
els, and our model is a special case, has been pro-
posed by Owen (1975), who shows that the core is
nonempty and that a solution can be obtained from
the associated linear program (LP) problem. The solu-
tion is based on market prices, which correspond to
the shadow prices in the linear program. Each com-
pany’s contribution can be found by computing its
contribution to the dual objective function value. We
assume that company c has contribution sci to supply
constraint i and dcj to demand constraint j . Here we
assume that the supply of each supply node, si, is the
summation of all companies, i.e., si =
∑
c s
c
i . The same
splitting also applies for the demand nodes. Then we
can compute its contribution as
yc =
∑
i∈I
uis
c
i +
∑
j∈J
vjd
c
j 0 (13)
In many applications the entities wish to share the
relative savings equally. One such approach, called
equal profit method (EPM), is suggested in Frisk et al.
(2010). In this approach, the following LP is solved
min f
s.t. f ≥ yi
c48i95
− yj
c48j95
1 ∀ i1 j∑
j∈S
yj ≤ c4S51 ∀S ⊂N∑
j∈N
yj = c4N 5
(14)
The first constraint set is to measure the pairwise
difference between the profits of the entities. The vari-
able f is used in the objective to minimize the largest
difference. The two other constraint sets define all sta-
ble allocations. In cases where the objective is not zero
(no difference between the entities) the reason is that
there is a coalition that has an incentive to break out;
i.e., the core constraints must be satisfied. The EPM is
related to a weighted version of the constrained egali-
tarian allocation (CEA) method (Dutta and Ray 1991).
The CEA method seeks to pick a point in the core
where the allocated amounts are as equal as possible.
We can also define a weighted version of the CEA
method (Koster 1999). In order to relate the weighted
CEA method to the method of Frisk et al. (2010), we
set the weight of player i equal to 1/c48i95.
In Table 3, we show the results when we use a vol-
ume weighted allocation, Shapley values, dual prices,
and EPM. It is clear that the results are very different
for the applied methods.
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Table 3 Relative Savings in Percentage with Sharing Principles:
Volume, Shapley Values, Dual Prices, and EPM
Company Volume Shapley Dual EPM
Company 1 900 501 401 607
Company 2 907 900 1207 808
Company 3 002 507 −108 808
Company 4 1909 902 1107 808
Company 5 1102 1305 1402 808
Company 6 403 806 1203 808
Company 7 1302 1508 1506 808
Company 8 1400 609 901 808
4. What Happened with the
Companies
The research project provided the expected savings
of each potential coalitions between the eight compa-
nies. The expected savings were interesting however
the sharing of it was not simple. The results of the
study were presented to the managers. Each partici-
pating company was pleased and impressed with the
large savings in both cost and CO2 emissions. There
was a discussion on how the overall cost and/or cost
reduction should be split. In the forestry business, the
cost is often based on average price per metric ton or
cubic meter. Hence, a natural way of splitting the cost
is for each company to take a share of the total cost
corresponding to its proportion of volume. The result
of a volume-based weighting is viewed in Table 3,
but it was not acceptable that the second largest com-
pany (Company 5) would gain only 0.2%. This dif-
ference in savings between the companies was too
high and it was impossible to reach an agreement.
The reasons for this difference in relative savings are
twofold. First, each company takes responsibility for
its own supply and makes sure it is delivered to
the new destinations (coupling between supply and
demand points). Secondly, the geographical distribu-
tion differs between companies and this affects the
new distribution solution and the individual impact
of each company.
In order to come up with a sharing principle
that the companies could agree on, several shar-
ing principles based on economic models including
Shapley value, the nucleolus, separable and nonsepa-
rable costs, shadow prices, and volume weights were
tested and analyzed. As part of the analysis, the EPM
was developed. The motivation was to get an allo-
cation that provided an as equal as possible relative
profit among the participants. In addition, it satisfies
core constraints from cooperative game theory and is
a stable solution the explicit mathematical formula-
tion of the method was presented in §3. This approach
was acceptable to the forest companies. It was fur-
ther extended in a two-stage process where the first
stage identified volumes that made a contribution to
the collaboration, i.e., volumes in the integrated solu-
tion that were not the same as in the individual solu-
tions. Then the EPM was applied to these identified
volumes.
As a result of the case study, three companies
started collaborating in 2008 by coordinating their
planning on a monthly basis. Before each month, each
company provided the information about supply and
demand to a third party logistics, provider in this case
the Forestry Research Institute of Sweden. Then an
integrated plan (i.e., common plan) was made and
the result was given back to the forest companies
for their own detailed transportation planning. The
sharing principle was based on having the same rel-
ative savings applied to each company’s own sup-
ply. In addition, there were some constraints such as
making sure that each company was the main sup-
plier for its own mills and that pairwise exchange
flows were the same. The latter is to avoid financial
exchanges between companies. Moreover, core condi-
tions were not included. With this revised model, it
was not possible to guarantee a stable solution, but
the companies were of the opinion that this part was
not that important. More important however, was that
they could trust each other in the long term. The
approach was tested during four months in 2008 and
the potential savings were 5%–15% each month. Cur-
rently in development is a web-based application for
common plans where a third party logistics provider
is not required.
5. Game
The game can be played in three versions. The first
version has four companies and four players the sec-
ond includes five companies (five players) and the
third, all eight companies (eight players). In the ver-
sions with four and five companies, more information
is provided to the players. Here, all actual costs of all
the possible coalitions are provided. All versions of
the game are played during a two- to three-hour lec-
ture. In a standard class, there will be a set of groups
of four (or five) students. The best layout is to have
the students of each group gathered together around a
table. Each group should have space to move around
the table. Each participant will receive a document
explaining the game and providing the needed infor-
mation. Students are not expected to prepare in any
way. It is better to have them read papers on game
theory after they experienced the game. The informa-
tion provided for the students in version 1 (four com-
panies/four players) is described below.
We first outline the purpose of the game and give
a printout map, shown in Figure 4, of supply points
and demand points for each of the four companies.
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Figure 4 Maps for Companies 1, 2, 3, and 4
Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 Company 4
Note. Supply areas are shaded and dark circles are plants.
Each company can work individually and has a spe-
cific transportation cost. A summary of the compa-
nies when they are working individually during one
month is given in Table 4.
The companies can form one or several coalitions (a
set of companies working together). If they work in a
coalition, they simply treat their supply and demand
as common and can find a solution that lowers the
overall transportation cost. For example, if compa-
nies 1 and 2 work individually, the overall cost is
3,780 (Company 1) + 14,860 (Company 2) = 18,640
kSEK. However, if they work together, the cost is
18,300 kSEK, which represents a savings of 340 kSEK
(18,640−18,300). One question is how these 340 kSEK
should be divided between the two companies, 1
and 2. There are many possible coalitions, and Table 5
summarizes the costs and savings for all possible con-
ditions. The improvement in the table is given as
percentage, i.e., savings divided by the aggregated
individual cost. For example, the improvement for
coalition (Company 1 + Company 2 + Company 3) is
computed as 11270/281980 = 4038%.
In the collaboration game, each group consists
of four players. Each player is responsible for one
company. The objective for each player is to improve
its own cost/profit as much as possible. The task is
to discuss and agree which companies should work
Table 4 Summary of the Four Companies and Their Transportation
Volume (m3), Transportation Cost (kSEK), and Average
Transportation Distance (km)
Company Volume Individual cost Average distance
Company 1 771300 31780 7003
Company 2 3011300 141860 5608
Company 3 2321100 101340 6805
Company 4 891300 41960 6805
Total 7001000 331940 —
together (if any). The decision on how the over-
all savings should be divided within the companies
in a coalition is part of deciding which companies
should work together. In phase 1, only two companies
can work together. In phase 2, any coalition struc-
ture is possible. For example, all companies can work
together, no companies work together, or any group
of two or three companies can work together. Each
company can only participate in one coalition in each
of the game.
Once the first phase is played, we have a discussion
on how the participants made their decisions, their
thinking, and their bargaining power. We also discuss
the different results (displayed for all groups) that
the students have agreed on. This discussion is often
interesting and provides a good basis for the second
phase. To support this discussion, we have developed
an Excel sheet where each group solution is inserted
through an easy input form (Results_4companies.xlsx
is provided as a supplementary file). Figure 5 gives
an example from phase 2 when eight groups have
Table 5 Summary of Possible Coalitions and Their Cost if They Work
Together, Summed Individual Cost, and Savings and
Improvement
Coalition Cost (kSEK) Cost (kSEK) Improvement
(companies) (collaboration) (individual) Savings (kSEK) (%)
1 + 2 181300 181640 340 1082
1 + 3 141000 141120 120 0085
1 + 4 81510 81740 230 2063
2 + 3 241210 251200 990 3093
2 + 4 191040 191820 780 3094
3 + 4 151060 151300 240 1057
1 + 2 + 3 271710 281980 11270 4038
1 + 2 + 4 221490 231600 11110 4070
1 + 3 + 4 181580 191080 500 2062
2 + 3 + 4 281400 301160 11760 5084
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 321000 331940 11940 5072
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Figure 5 Input Information from Eight Groups with Their Agreed Upon Coalition and Agreed Upon Savings
Note. In this case all eight groups agreed on the grand coalition, but the agreed upon savings are quite different.
inserted their solution. First the coalitions agreed are
inserted and then the agreed savings for each com-
pany within each coalition. The coalitions are selected
in the white area of rows 4–7 using a dropdown
list and the agreed savings are inserted in the white
area of rows 12–15. All input is done in the white
areas whereas the grey areas are information com-
puted based on the input. Based on the input, two
results are generated. In the Excel sheets, the compa-
nies are denoted C1 (Company l), C2 (Company 2) etc.
First, we compute the relative savings for each com-
pany. This is viewed in a table which is illustrated in
Figure 6. Here it is easy to see how fair the distribu-
tion is. For example, group 1 selected a full coalition,
which gives an average saving of 5.76%. However, the
Figure 6 Relative Savings for Each Company Based on the Inserted Solution
agreed savings for the companies turned out to be
3.97%, 6.59%, 5.42%, and 5.04%. Second, the same rel-
ative savings are also shown in an Excel graph, shown
in Figure 7. These results typically generate a lively
discussion among the students about rationality, fair-
ness and trust.
Version 2 of the game is identical to version 1
except that a fifth company is added. This makes
the first phase a bit more complicated because at
least one company must be left outside a coalition.
Moreover, the new fifth company has spread of its
resources, providing high potential for collaboration
and therefore, raising its power. The supplementary
file for version 2 is Results_5companies.xlsx.
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Figure 7 Relative Savings for Each Company Based on the Inserted
Solutions from the Eight Groups
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The information provided for the students in ver-
sion 3 (eight students and companies) is different.
Each company has information about its total cost
together with the information about collaborating
with one other company. There is no information on
collaborating with three or several companies. In this
version, it is more important to find agreements with-
out knowing the real benefits. In Table 6, we provide
the information for one company. Version 3 also has
two phases. In the first phase, coalitions of at most
two companies should be found. This is more diffi-
cult, compared to versions 1 and 2 because there are
many more alternatives. Also, here it is very clear
that companies 2 and 3 have much higher negotiation
power. In the second phase, any coalition and princi-
ple for sharing the benefit may be used. In this version
of the game, the students do not know the savings
when they decide to collaborate. They need to define
the coalition and set the principle they will follow
for the splitting of the savings. Only the real benefits
of the agreed coalitions are announced to the agreed
groups. They finish the game by computing the sav-
ings following the principle they have agreed on.
Once the game is played, we follow up with what
happened in the industrial case study and what
sharing mechanisms were tested and used. We intro-
duce the students to basic game theory, including the
Table 6 Costs and Savings (kSEK) When Company 1 Works Together
with a Second (2–8) Company
Company Company Cost (separate) Cost (together) Savings
1 2 181640 181300 340
1 3 141120 141000 120
1 4 81740 81510 230
1 5 81520 81490 30
1 6 51840 51770 70
1 7 51660 51660 0
1 8 41110 41100 10
core conditions, efficient allocation, and individual
rationality concepts. We then go through well-known
methods such as the Shapley values and the shadow
price approach. We also show results when using a
simple “volume” based allocation method, which is
often used in practice. Finally, we present the retained
approach called the equal profit method. Essentially
we make a quick run through material similar to §4
in this paper.
There is also a discussion of other drivers for the
collaboration. These are the effects of CO2 emissions,
trust, and long-term relationships. To form any coali-
tion is also highly dependent on which company is
the driver and which business model each company
has. Therefore, we discuss different business models
and behavior and how the coalitions can be formed.
More information and results based on the case study
can be found in Audy et al. (2012).
The closing discussion always brings up the chal-
lenges of building long-term relationships between
the players. Key aspects of the transaction cost the-
ory and the agency theory are used to sustain the
discussion. Finally, we tend to use this discussion to
reinforce the contribution of game theory to assess
the potential of collaborative logistics as well as pro-
voke reflection on other aspects of long-term relations
such as trust, communication, coordination mecha-
nism, and contracts. We also provide extra reading.
For example, the papers by Audy et al. (2010) and
Lehoux et al. (2009) are good complements to the
game because they report on collaborative logistics
cases. It is clear that this game does not cover all the
important issues, but we believe that it contributes to
students developing key competencies for establish-
ing higher quality collaboration in logistics.
6. Experiences
We have played this game with students, business
people, and researchers in France, Sweden, Norway,
Chile, and Canada. All information (PDF docu-
ments, Excel sheets, and PowerPoint presentation) are
provided on a password-protected part of the ITE
website, accessible only to the instructors. We first
developed version 3 of the game where eight play-
ers are provided with the company information and
information on the impact of partnering with another
company. For example, company 1, knows its cost,
average transportation distance, and the geographical
location of its catchment areas and industries. Com-
pany 1 also knows the potential benefit of pairing
with company 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, respectively. It
does not know the benefit of being part of a larger
coalition. For us this was the replication of the case
study because there are eight companies involved in
the real case. However, we found that the players
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with the smallest companies were rapidly put aside.
The only way they could really be heard by the oth-
ers was to join forces with them even though they
did not have any incentive at first sight. As a group,
they are perceived as an interesting “larger” player.
Then others start discussing collaboration with them
as a group. This was difficult for the students to real-
ize; very few participants saw the potential of this
strategy and were capable of using its power in the
negotiation process.
Running the game in different countries permitted
us to capture cultural differences. These observations
cannot be generalized but are interesting to discuss
here because they illustrate strategies in dealing with
the case. North Americans tend to build their coalition
one by one, which is in contrast with Scandinavians
who typically start with the grand coalition and rarely
eliminate a company from the grand coalition. Partic-
ipants from France and Chile used mixed strategies
mainly based on relations—pairing with their friends.
In Chile, one group decided to eliminate the small-
est company and gave the player the responsibility of
mediating the grand coalition. In this game the play-
ers focus more on coalition building than on design-
ing the sharing mechanism.
We then developed version 1 of the game. This ver-
sion deals with a smaller number of companies and
provides more information. Each player knows the
potential benefit of paring with all other companies.
The players are rapidly challenged because no equi-
librium exists and they need to negotiate an incentive
to get the maximum out of the grand coalition. The
discussions are easier to manage than in version 3 of
the game because only four players are involved in
each group. The players focus more on the sharing
mechanism than on coalition building. We then devel-
oped version 2 (with five companies/players) as we
wanted to create a more difficult negotiation situa-
tion in the first phase. In this version, one company
must be left outside as only two coalitions of two
companies can be made in phase 1. This creates more
discussions and negotiations among the participants.
This version is the one we use most frequently today.
We have also developed an Excel sheet for versions
1 and 2 to illustrate the results and characteristics of
the most common sharing principles. In the version
with four and in particular with five companies, it is
clear how much bargaining power the largest com-
pany has. All others have an incentive to collaborate
with this company, which often can come up with
very good agreements. It is also interesting to note
when all companies are working together, much of
this bargaining power of the largest company is lost
and the agreements provide relative savings of the
same order.
7. Conclusions
Collaboration among supply chains is attracting inter-
est from academic and industrial communities. It is
seen as a new approach to increase the value created
through better cross-chain coordination. However,
most agree that establishing efficient and sustainable
collaborations requires highly skilled and competent
people. This is why we developed this business game.
Business games are often used for developing com-
plex competences. This is the case for this game
because the participants integrate advanced game the-
ory knowledge as well as develop their negotiation
skills. Moreover, it also provides an insight into how
differently the bargaining power can be based on the
size and location of the companies.
To be efficient, business games need to be simple
and meaningful. The game proposed in this paper
focuses on two aspects of collaboration in logistics:
coalition building and sharing mechanism. It is sim-
ple to explain and to run. Moreover, the game builds
on an industrial case study providing a meaningful
background in terms of the data (e.g., maps, costs,
distances, and volumes) and human behavior. It also
shows that the theories learned through the exercise
are relevant to students.
Supplementary Material
Files that accompany this paper can be found and down-
loaded from http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/ited.1120.0090.
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